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Taxation of an Attorney's Contingency Fee of a Punitive
.
Damages Recovery: The Snvastava
Approach *
I. INTRODUCTION
With its landmark tax decision in Commissioner v. Glenshaw Glass
Co., 1 the United States Supreme Court adopted the rule that litigants are
required to include the punitive damages portion of awards in their taxable income. The Court's decision was based on the nature of the award,
which the Court characterized as "undeniable accessions to wealth,
2
clearly realized, and over which the taxpayers have complete dominion."
Based on this treatment, the Court concluded that punitive damages were
clearly of the nature that Congress intended to be taxed, and reversed the
Third Circuit's decision. 3 This interpretation is now codified in section
I 04 of the Internal Revenue Code, which exempts actual damages from
certain lawsuits, but does not exempt punitive damages. 4
In spite of the Glenshaw Glass decision, there is still dispute about
certain aspects of the punitive damages award. Recently, a noticeable
split has occurred in the federal circuit courts regarding the proper treatment of the portion of a punitive damages award retained by the litigant's
5
attorney as a contingency fee. This dispute between the circuits seems
ripe for determination by the United States Supreme Court, but until the
Supreme Court resolves the conflict, taxpayers and their attorneys are
faced with the challenge of determining how they should calculate their
taxes and approach the situation.
This Note will first consider the reasoning employed by the different
circuit courts of appeal, with particular emphasis on the decision of the
Fifth Circuit in Srivastava v. Commissioner, which held that the portion
of the settlement payable to the attorney under the contingency agree6
ment was not gross income for taxable purposes. The Srivastava ap-

*

Copyright© 2001 by Benjamin C Rasmussen.
I. Commissioner v. Glenshaw Glass Co., 348 U.S. 426 ( 1955).
2. !d. at 431 (emphasis added).
3. !d. at 432-33.
4. 26 U.S. C. § I04(a)(2) ( 1994).
5. See, ex, Srivastava v. Commissioner, 220 F. 3d 353 (5th Cir. 2000); Benci-Woodward v.
Commissioner, 219 F. 3d 941 (9th Cir. 2000).
6. See Srivastava, 220 F. 3d 353.
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proach will be compared to other circuits to determine the key trends in
the decisions. Next, this Note will address the most sound approaches
and important considerations for practitioners dealing with the issue until
such time as the United States Supreme Court gives a more definitive answer to the question. Finally, this Note will examine possible solutions to
this critical issue.
II. THE FIFfH CIRCUIT APPROACH: SR!VASTA VA V. COMMISSIONER

A. Factual Background

The Fifth Circuit's opportunity to address the question of taxation of
the contingency fee portion of a punitive damages recovery arose out of a
substantial defamation suit involving two married doctors, Sudhir Srivastava and Elizabeth S. Pascual (Petitioners). 7 Petitioners were awarded
twenty-nine million dollars in a jury verdict after a Texas television station aired a series of investigative reports accusing the Petitioners of poor
medical care and various criminal acts, which destroyed the Petitioners'
medical practice and led to severe financial and emotional distress for the
family. 8 After appeals, the parties came to a settlement with the station
and its insurance carriers for $8.5 million. 9 The parties divided the
portions of the award paid by the station and three insurance companies,
but did not distinguish between the actual and punitive damages ordered
in making the settlement allotment. 10 After the Petitioners reported no
taxable income from their award, the Internal Revenue Service issued a
notice of deficiency to Petitioners allocating amounts to actual damages,
punitive damages, and interest in proportion to the original jury award
and taxing the amounts allocated to punitive damages and interest. 11 The
Internal Revenue Service's estimation left the Petitioners with
$1,466,348 in additional taxes and penalties for the tax years 1991 and
1992. 12 Upon appeal to the Tax Court, Petitioners argued that the portion
of the settlement paid to their attorneys under a contingency fee agreement was not includable in gross income. The Tax Court rejected their
argument 13 and allocated the settlement agreement similarly to the ap-

7. See id. at 355.
8. See id.
9. See id.
10. See id. at 356.
II. See id.
12. See id.
13. While not addressed in this casenote, the Tax Court has addressed this issue in an en bane
decision. In Kenseth v. Commissioner, 114 T.C. 399 (2000), the Tax Court, by an 8-5 vote, concluded that attorneys' contingency fees are taxable to the client. See id. at 417.

301] TAXATION OF AN ATTORNEY'S CONTINGENCY FEE

303

proach of the Internal Revenue Service. 14 It sustained the deficiency
based upon the punitive damages award, but eliminated the penalties for
Petitioners' failure to include the amounts in their reported income because of their reasonable cause for failing to do so. 15
B. Say One Thing, Do the Opposite
1. Clean slate perspective

The Srivastava court began its analysis by looking at the facts of the
case as if it was going to make the decision on a tabula rasa. 16 The court
first looked for answers within the doctrine of anticipatory assignment of
income. 17 The court noted that the doctrine usually centers around two
extremes: where the taxpayer who controls the source of the income assigns future income to another to avoid taxation, or, in the alternative,
where the taxpayer fully divests himself of control over the source by
transferring or selling it to another. 18 Had this case fallen into one of
those easily determined streams, the court thought that the solution
would have been straight forward, but the Fifth Circuit felt that "contingent fee contracts defy easy categorization." 19 The court was of the opinion that the contingency fee arrangement involved something similar to a
partnership agreement with "virtual co-ownership" and a division of
property. 2° Concluding that this analysis gave no clear answer, the court
looked to which party did the work to produce the money under the contingency fee agreement, whether the contingency fee agreement involved
a gratuitous transfer as opposed to an arm's length transfer, as well as
how the uncertainty of the ultimate value of the contingency fee agreement affected the analysis. 21 In all three cases, the court concluded that
the resulting analysis was of little or no help in determining whether the
portion retained by the attorney should be taxed to the client. 22
Ultimately, the court determined that the closest analogy involved a
plaintiff in a contingency fee case versus a plaintiff retaining counsel on
a non-contingent fee agreement. 23 The court concluded that the use of the

14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.

Srivastava, 220 F.3d at 356-57.
See id. at 357.
See id.
See id. at 358.
See id. at 358-59.
/d. at 360.
/d.
See id. at 360-62.

See id.
See id. at 362.
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contingency fee was merely a means of shifting the risk of loss, but that
in the case of a judgment, both plaintiffs would have to pay their attor24
neys and should be taxed on their income in like manner. The court hypothesized that it would not be fair to give Petitioners a tax windfall
based solely on their choice of fee arrangement, because regardless of the
arrangement they would still enjoy the same economic benefit upon fa25
vorable resolution of the case.

2. Adherence to questioned precedent
In spite of its analysis leading to the contrary conclusion, the Fifth
Circuit decided that it could not rule on the matter from a clean slate, but
26
instead was bound to follow the Cotnam v. Commissioner decision,
which held that the amount of the contingency fee paid out of the judgment to the attorney was not income to the taxpayer because, under Alabama law, the attorney has an interest in the amount of the contingency
fee. 27 The Internal Revenue Service urged the court to distinguish the
case from Cotnam based on the different rights each state afforded to attorneys under a contingency fee arrangement. However, the Fifth Circuit
declined to do so, concluding that this decision more appropriately belonged in the anticipatory assignment of income analysis, which pro28
duced no clear distinction between the two cases.
In order to understand the conclusion of the Fifth Circuit, it is important to understand the precedent to which the court felt bound. Cotnam is
the oldest standing opinion concerning the taxability of attorney's contingency fees from punitive damages. The Cotnam decision involved a
question of Alabama law. 29 Alabama law gave attorneys what was essen30
tially an equitable interest in their clients' recoveries. The taxpayer in
Cotnam was precluded from receiving her part of the judgment because
of her attorney's equitable lien on the judgment as applied by the courts
31
of Alabama. The court concluded that because the taxpayer never
would have been able to recover anything without the aid of counsel and
because the attorneys earned the contingency fee in which they had a
strong interest under Alabama law, the taxpayer had not realized any

24.
25.
26.
Glenshaw
27.
28.
29.
30.

See id. at 362-63.
See id. at 363.
263 F.2d 119 (5th Cir. 1959). Cotnam was decided just four years after the landmark
Glass decision originally required inclusion of punitive damages in gross income.
See Srivastava, 220 F.3d at 363.
/d. at 363-64.
See Cotnam. 263 F.2d at 125.
See id.
31. See id.
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economic benefit from that portion of the recovery and could not be
32
taxed for it. By comparison, Srivastava involved Texas law, which provides that "the lawyer's rights, based on the contingent fee contract, are
wholly derivative from those of his client." 33
B. Why Not Right the Perceived Wrong?

The differences in the state laws concerning attorneys' interests in
contingency fees were clear, with Alabama law providing an attorney
with an equal, if not superior interest, to his client's damages recovery 34
and Texas law subordinating the rights of the attorney to those of his client.35 The distinctions would have allowed a simple mechanism to distinguish a precedent that the court's analysis clearly called into question.
The Internal Revenue Service drew this conclusion, 36 and Circuit Judge
37
James L. Dennis noted as much in his dissenting opinion. Judge Dennis
wrote:
[T]he taxpayers in the present case did not by virtue of their attorneyclient contract divest themselves of part of their interests in the claim,
or vest a legal, independently enforceable ownership interest in that
claim in their attorneys. Accordingly, the taxpayers received as income
the portions of the settlement consisting of punitive damages and interest that were earmarked for the payment of their attorney's fees, and I
38
believe that the taxpayer must pay taxes on those proceeds.

The Srivastava court's adherence to a 41-year-old precedent, despite
a logical means for the precedent to be distinguished, brings to mind the
wisdom of former Supreme Court Justice Hugo Black. Justice Black
wrote in another setting, "[ w ]hen precedent and precedent alone is all the
argument that can be made to support a court-fashioned rule, it is time
for the rule's creator to destroy it. " 39 Even if the Srivastava court felt that
Cotnam followed a logical line of reason, the court noted in its own
analysis of the issue that it considered the Cotnam line of reasoning to be
40
unpersuasive. However, the dissent's reasoning in Cotnam provided

32. See id. at 125-26.
33. Dow Chemical Co. v. Benton, 357 S.W.2d 565, 567 (Tex. 1962).
34. ALA. CODE § 61 (1940), cited in Cotnam, 263 F.2d at 123 n.4.
35. See Dow Chemical Co., 357 S.W.2d at 567.
36. See Srivastava, 220 F.3d at 363.
37. See id. at 367 (Dennis, J., dissenting).
38. !d. at 369.
39. Francis v. Southern Pac. Co., 333 U.S. 445,471 (1948) (Black, J., dissenting).
40. The concurring opinion in Cotnam, which constituted the majority on this question, in
addition to focusing heavily on the distinguishable Alabama law, relied in large part on the argument
that without the services of the attorney, a client's claim would never bear fruit, and that as such, a
client should not be taxed on the portion it did not receive. See Cotnam, 263 F.2d at 125-26. Of this
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41
support for the Srivastava court's conclusion. The court noted the wide
42
disagreement that exists in the circuit courts on this issue. The majority
in Srivastava had plenty of reason for abandoning the old Fifth Circuit
rule and ample persuasive support from other circuits going the other
way. Its reliance on the antiquated Cotnam precedent at least raises questions.43
Indeed, when compared to the other circuits that have given opinions
on this issue, the Srivastava court was the only circuit that used precedent as a crutch in making its decision conform to an outcome it questioned. As will be seen, there is legal support for either position on this
critical issue. The analyses of the other circuits on both sides of the issue,
many of which were available for the Fifth Circuit to consider, make the
ultimate conclusion of the court less compelling and more questionable.
This Note will consider the lines of reasoning employed by these courts
and compare them to the Srivastava outcome.
III. CIRCUIT COURT APPROACHES INCLUDING THE ATTORNEY'S
CONTINGENCY FEE IN GROSS INCOME

In the last five years, three circuits have ruled against taxpayers who
44
excluded their attorneys' contingency fee from their gross income. In
most instances, these circuits have followed a similar line of reasoning.
Additionally, the line of reasoning prevailing in these circuits ts very
similar to the clean slate analysis provided in Srivastava.

A. The Federal Circuit
In 1995, the Federal Circuit addressed the issue in Baylin v. United
States. 45 Baylin involved a dispute between a partnership and the Mary-

line of reasoning the Srivastava court wrote, "That gain - no less than the non-monetary gains recognized as income in Earl, Horst, and their progeny- is not to be excluded from gross income solely
on the basis that the money is diverted to, and realized by, the taxpayer's assignee." Srivastava, 220
F.3d at 363.
41. Judge Wisdom dissented from the Cotnam decision under the theory that even though the
taxpayer never actually took control of the portion of her damages that went to her attorney under
the contingency fee agreement, she enjoyed the benefit of the damages award and should have been
taxed on it. See Cotnam, 263 F.2d at 127.
42. See Srivastava, 220 F. 3d at 358.
43. It should be noted that technically the Fifth Circuit could not have completely overruled
the Cotnam decision in Srivastava. Fifth Circuit rules preclude a three-judge panel from overturning
a prior decision within the circuit, absent an en bane review by the court. See Floors Unlimited, Inc.
v. Fieldcrest Cannon, Inc., 55 F.3d 181, 185 (5th Cir. 1995).
44. See Bend-Woodward v. Comm'r, 219 F.3d 941 (9th Cir. 2000); Coady v. Comm'r, 213
F.3d 1187 (9th Cir. 2000); Alexander v. IRS, 72 F.3d 938 (1st Cir. 1995); Baylin v. United States,
43 F.3d 1451 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
45. 43 F.3d at 1451.
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land State Highway Administration, which condemned 137 acres owned
by the partnership. 46 The partnership disputed the state's valuation of its
property and entered into a contingency fee agreement with its attorneys
to challenge the valuation in court. 47 The partnership deducted the legal
48
fees as a business expense incurred in the collection of income. The
court rejected the taxpayers' argument that the portion of the attorneys'
fees derived from interest on the principal judgment in their favor was a
business expense, focusing on the "origin of the claim" test from United
States v. Gilmore, 49 and determining that the legal fees in this case were
more appropriately classified as a capital expenditure. 5°
The taxpayers advanced an alternative argument that is more pertinent to this Note's analysis. They argued that because they assigned the
portion going to their attorneys in advance, they had never realized the
income. 51 They relied on Maryland law, which gives an attorney a lien
52
on the eventual judgment in the case of a contingency fee agreement.
The Federal Circuit, however, was not persuaded by the taxpayers' arguments. It noted that the lien available in Maryland Jaw simply gave the
attorneys extra security on the debt owed them by their client. 53 This
court was most persuaded by the fact that the courts have broadly defined
the definition of gross income and reasoned that, unless specifically exempted, the taxpayers' accession to wealth was taxable. 54 The court
noted that the taxpayers clearly enjoyed a benefit from the increased
valuation brought about by their attorneys' work and did not accept that
the taxpayers and their attorneys could dictate their own treatment under
the law. 55 Specifically, the court noted that "[t]he temporarily uncertain
magnitude of the legal fees under such an arrangement and the vehicle of
an assignment cannot dictate the income tax treatment of those fees." 56
As evidenced by the three paragraphs of treatment the court gave the issue, the Federal Circuit didn't seem to find the issue a difficult one. 57

46. See id. at 1452.
47. /d.
48. See id. at 1453; 26 U.S.C. § 212(1) (1988).
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.

372 U.S. 39 (1963).
See Bay/in, 43 F.3d at 1453-54.
See id. at 1454-55.
See id. at 1455.
See id.
See id. at 1454.
See id. at 1454-55.
/d. at 1455.
See id. at 1454-55.

B.Y.U. JOURNAL OF PUBLIC LAW

308

[Volume 15

B. The First Circuit
Later in 1995 the First Circuit indirectly addressed this issue in Alexander v. Internal Revenue Service. 58 Alexander involved a terminated
employee who obtained a settlement from his former employer after he
filed suit seeking damages for age discrimination and breach of contract.59 The First Circuit rejected the taxpayers' arguments that his legal
fees were deductible under several sections of the code. 60
Like the taxpayers in Baylin, after losing other battles, the taxpayer
in Alexander sought to exclude part of his attorneys' fees from gross income because he never had control. 61 After the settlement, the employer
provided checks jointly payable to the taxpayer and his attorneys in satis62
faction of the agreement. The taxpayer argued that under 26 U.S.C. §
62(a)(2)(A), where the taxpayer was being classified as an employee by
the court, satisfaction of his contingency fee agreement by payment to
63
the attorneys was a deductible reimbursement arrangement. Like Baylin, the taxpayer in Alexander tried to persuade the court with state law,
in this case Massachusetts, which gave the attorney a lien on the payment, and which precluded the taxpayer from enjoying the benefit of that
64
portion of the funds.
The First Circuit did not address the issue in the manner that the
other similarly holding circuits did. Instead, the First Circuit refused to
consider the issue where there was no support in the record that a contin65
gency fee agreement was formally entered into. The court rejected the
taxpayer's argument that the agreement was implied by the parties as
part of the standard operating procedure for cases of the kind. 66 Although
the setting in which it rejected the taxpayer's argument is distinguishable, the First Circuit demonstrated that it would not let the taxpayer use
67
his agreement with his attorney to avoid tax liability.

C. The Ninth Circuit
The Federal Circuit and the First Circuit differed from Srivastava in
that no reference was made to Cotnam as support for the taxpayers' at58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.

65.
66.
67.

72 F.3d 938 (1st Cir. 1995).
id. at 940.
id. at 941.
id. at 945.

See
See
See
See
See
See
See
See
See

id.
id. at 945-46.
id. at 946.
id.
id.
id.
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tempts to exclude their attorneys' contingency fees from taxable income.
However, the case in which the Ninth Circuit first addressed the issue,
Coady v. Commissioner, 68 involved a direct argument by the taxpayer
based on Cotnam, although it was not controlling precedent for that
69
court. Coady, like Alexander, was a wrongful termination suit where
the taxpayer claimed a deduction for his attorneys' fees. The taxpayer relied directly on Cotnam and claimed that they had not realized the income because it was assigned to their attorneys. 70 Alaska law gives an
attorney a lien on his client's funds, but the Alaska courts have interpreted it not to give any ownership interest to the attorney, thus differing
from the Alabama statute involved in Cotnam. 71
At the outset, the Ninth Circuit recognized that a split existed among
the circuits on this issue. 72 However, this court found convincing the reasoning employed by the courts in Bay/in and Alexander, as well as the
reasoning of the dissent in Cotnam. 73 The court wrote that "[t]he Supreme Court has explicitly rejected the notion that taxation can be escaped by procuring payment directly to creditors or by making anticipatory arrangements to prevent earnings from 'vesting even for a second'
in the person who earned it."74 Like the Federal Circuit, the Ninth Circuit
refused to distinguish a contingency fee arrangement because of the uncertainty of the outcome and held that anticipatory assignments made to
prevent earnings from vesting in the taxpayer will not be recognized for
tax purposes. 75 The court further distinguished the case from Cotnam and
Estate of Clarks v. United States, 76 which will be considered in the next
section of this Note, based on the nature of the state law, where Cotnam
was based on a law where attorneys have a greater interest in their portion of the judgment than their clients under a contingency fee arrangement.77
The Ninth Circuit addressed the issue again in a decision filed a little
over a month after its Coady decision, Benci-Woodward v. Commissioner.78 Benci-Woodward dealt with an issue more similar to Srivastava
than the other courts, choosing to not exclude an attorney's contingency

68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.

213 F.3d 1187 (9th Cir. 2000).
See id. at 1188.
See id.
See id. at 1190.
See id. at 1189.
See id. at 1190.
!d. at 1191.
See id. at 1191.
202 F.3d 854 (6th Cir. 2000).
See Coady, 213 F.3d at 1190.
219 F.3d 941 (9th Cir. 2000).

310

B.Y.U. JOURNAL OF PUBLIC LAW

[Volume 15

fee income from the taxpayer's gross income. Benci-Woodward involved
the portion of attorneys' fees arising from a punitive damages award in a
tort complaint filed against Target Stores for several torts and contract
79
counts, including wrongful terrnination. Benci-Woodward was based on
California law, in which contingency fee contracts "do not operate to
transfer a part of the cause of action to the attorney but only give him a
lien upon his client's recovery." 80 As such, the Ninth Circuit deferred to
its Coady decision and distinguished the California law based on the
81
lesser interest available to an attorney in the state.

D. Prevailing Themes in the Federal, First, and Ninth Circuits
There are two important prevailing themes in the decisions of the
courts that have required inclusion of an attorney's contingency fee portion of a settlement or award in gross income. First, these courts have
generally done so under the theory that for tax purposes contingency fee
agreements are nothing more than anticipatory assignments of income
82
from the client to the attorney. Courts have consistently held that such
transfers of interest will not provide a means for the taxpayer to reduce
83
his liability. Second, these courts have consistently distinguished their
respective cases based on state laws that do not provide the attorney with
84
an equal interest in the contingency fee. Both of these themes are similar to analyses considered, favored, and ultimately rejected by the Srivastava court in the name of precedent. 85 However, the Fifth Circuit, as
evidenced in the next section of this note, is not the only court to take the
position it did.
IV. OTHER CIRCUIT COURT APPROACHES EXCLUDING THE ATTORNEY'S
CONTINGENCY FEE FROM GROSS INCOME

Aside from the Fifth Circuit, two other circuits have taken the position that the contingency fee received by the attorney is not taxable income to the client. The Eleventh and Sixth Circuits have also followed

79. See id. at 942-43.
80. Fifield Manorv. Finston, 354 P.2d 1073, 1079 (Cal. 1960).
81. See Benci-Woodward, 219 F.3d at 943.
82. See Baylin, 43 F.3d at 1454-55; Coady, 213 F.3d at 1188-91.
83. See e.g., Lucas v. Earl, 281 U.S. Ill ( 1930).
84. See Baylin, 43 F.3d at 1455; Coady, 213 F.3d at 1190; Bend-Woodward, 219 F.3d at
943; Alexander, 72 F.3d at 946. Although the Alexander court did not specifically distinguish the
Massachusetts law, it did reject the taxpayer's claim under the Massachusetts statute in similar fashion to the other courts discussed in this section.
85. See Srivastava, 220 F.3d at 362-63, 369. But see id. at 363-64 (declining to distinguish
the case based on the differences in Texas and Alabama law).
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this approach. 86 While the Eleventh Circuit approach was ultimately
somewhat similar to that employed in Srivastava, the Sixth Circuit employed a different line of reasoning that demonstrates more fully the differences in the opinions on this side of the issue.

A. The Eleventh Circuit
The Internal Revenue Service has attempted to challenge the Cotnam
rule in the Eleventh Circuit, in addition to the Fifth. The Eleventh Circuit
was split off from the old Fifth Circuit in 1981 and is bound by Cotnam
to the same extent as the present Fifth Circuit. The Internal Revenue Service brought its Eleventh Circuit challenge in Davis v. Commissioner. 87
This case arose out of a lawsuit against a mortgage company in which
the taxpayer won over six million dollars, nearly all in punitive damages.88 In Davis, the taxpayer prevailed at the Tax Court level prior to
consideration by the Eleventh Circuit.
The Eleventh Circuit's consideration of the issue was the briefest of
all of the circuits addressing similar questions. The court noted that this
was simply an attempt by the Internal Revenue Service to get the circuit
to do away with precedent that the Service did not like. 89 The Eleventh
Circuit considered Davis to be right on point with the earlier Cotnam decision and affirmed the decision of the Tax Court in accordance with a
precedent "squarely on point." 90 However, unlike the Fifth Circuit in Srivastava, the Eleventh Circuit did not openly call into question its own
decision by undermining its logic with contradictory reasoning and
. 91
anaIysts.

B. The Sixth Circuit
The Sixth Circuit dealt with the treatment of an attorney's contingency fee in Clarks. 92 This case arose after K-Mart Corporation lost a
personal injury case brought by Arthur Clarks in 1988.93 K-Mart paid the
damages in 1991 with interest and shortly thereafter Clarks died. 94 The

86. See Clarks, 202 F.3d at 854; Davis v. Comm'r, 210 F.3d 1346 (lith Cir. 2000).
87. 210 F.3d 1346.
88. See id. at 1347.
89. See id. at 1347 n.4.
90. Id. at 1347. The court further noted that it could not overrule Cotnam without a hearing
of the en bane court. See supra note 44.
91. The Davis court did not have the opportunity to distinguish Cotnam under state laws as
did the Srivastava court. Davis involved Alabama law, just as Cotnam did. See id. at 1346.
92. 202 F. 3d 854 (6th Cir. 2000).
93. See id. at 855.
94. See id.
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issue arises in Clarks because Clarks' estate failed to include the contingency fee portion arising out of the interest on the judgment in Clarks'
95
Form 1040 for 1991. The estate never received the portion of the inter96
est payable to the attorneys under the contingency fee. After auditing
the estate's return, the Internal Revenue Service issued a deficiency notice because the estate failed to include the attorneys' fees as gross income.97
After the district court granted summary judgment against the estate,
98
the Sixth Circuit reversed. The Sixth Circuit's analysis, like many of
the other circuits addressing the issue, centered on Cotnam. After considering the Cotnam decision, the Clarks court looked to Michigan law to
compare the attorney's interest in the contingency fee to the Alabama
99
law in Cotnam. The Sixth Circuit was persuaded by the fact that under
Michigan law the contingency fee agreement assigned a portion of the
judgment to the attorney, and at the same time gave him superior rights
100
to recovery of that portion than those of his client.
On this basis, the Sixth Circuit sought to distinguish itself from the
Federal Circuit in Bay/in. It said that the Baylin court's reliance on Lucas
101
v. Ear/ and Helvering v. Horst 101 did not apply to this case because the
assignments in those cases centered around gifts to family members al103
ready earned by the taxpayer and vested to him. The Clarks court reasoned that the assignment in a contingency fee case was totally different
for a couple of reasons. First, it noted that under a typical assignment to
avoid income, the assignee was not taxed on the income because it is
104
taxable income to the assignor or donor under Lucas and Horst. The
court contrasted this to a contingency fee arrangement where the attorney
will be taxed on the income, allowing for double taxation under the approach the Internal Revenue Service was advocating. 105
Second, the Sixth Circuit focused on the nature of the assignment,
reasoning that it was closer to a division of property between tenants in
106
common or a partnership. More importantly perhaps, the court focused

95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.

See id.
See id.
See id.
See id. at 856.
See id.
See id.
281 U.S. III (1930).
311 U.S. 112 (1940).
See Clarks, 202 F.3d at 857.
See id.
See id.
See id. at 857-58.
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on the work involved in reaping the benefits of the personal injury judgment, noting that neither party would benefit from the money without the
skills and work of the attorney .107 The court wrote that "[t]he income
should be charged to the one who earned it and received it, not as under
the government's theory of the case, to one who neither received it nor
earned it." 108
Thus, in Clarks, the Sixth Circuit articulated a position to support
exclusion of an attorney's contingency fee (a derived interest on the
judgments as opposed to punitive damages in this case), which was not
the line of reasoning used by the other two circuits coming to similar
conclusions. Where Srivastava and Davis essentially based their decision
solely on the Cotnam precedent, Clarks articulated an approach based
partly on the treatment of the attorney lien under Michigan law, where
the court sought to avoid double taxation, as well as taxing the party who
earned and received possession of the money under a partnership approach, something that the client does not do under a contingency fee
agreement.
V. PRACTICAL CONSIDERATIONS: HOW SHOULD AN ATTORNEY ADVISE
HIS CLIENT NOW?

Given the wide range of opinions espoused by the circuits, practitioners face several issues in determining what approaches to take with their
clients. Among the concerns attorneys must consider is how best to protect their client's interests while simultaneously minimizing their tax exposure. The balance can be a tricky course that must be navigated with
precision. Attention to certain details and considerations will make an
attorney better able to protect his client in reporting income and dealing
with other related tax issues arising from the contingency fee agreement.
The first issue of particular concern is the nature of the attorney's
rights as afforded by the law of the state where the client resides. Most of
the cases have given some attention to the nature of the state's statutes or
case law and how an attorney's rights in his contingency fee compare to
the rights of his client. 109 Where many of the circuits allowing exclusion
of the attorneys' fees give deference to the rights of the attorney under
state law, attorneys practicing in states with favorable laws may have a
greater argument for urging their clients to exclude the attorneys' fees
from income. The argument may even be a valid one in circuits who
have sided with the Internal Revenue Service, since many such cases

107. See id. at 858.
108. /d.
109. See e.g., Srivastava, 220 F.3d at 363.
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were decided by distinguishing the nature of the state law from the Alabama statute involved in Cotnam. 110 With specific state legal rights in
mind, parties can structure contingency fee agreements to provide appropriate liens to the attorney, as well as structure the method that defendants will pay out settlements and judgments. 111
Along the same lines, attorneys need to carefully consider how certain documents can be structured to make the facts more favorable to the
client. The Srivastava court considered the Tax Court's allotment of the
settlement for purposes of determining what part of the settlement was
attributable to punitive damages and interest. 112 The taxpayer was arguably hindered because the settlement agreement did not specify the party's
intentions with regard to the all0tment between actual and other damages.113 The taxpayer was also limited in his ability to argue for a more
favorable allotment by virtue of the wording of his request for damages
in the original defamation complaint. 114 As such, practitioners would be
wise to carefully word settlement agreements, as well as any other pleadings throughout the litigation process, in such a way that will benefit the
client's tax interests down the road by expressing how the parties wish
the settlement to be allotted between the different kinds of damages.
While such attempts may not ultimately prevail in persuading the court,
they are likely to give an appellant more credibility in reaching their ultimate goal.
Next, attorneys should be careful to take into consideration the consequences of section 83 of the Internal Revenue Code. Section 83 provides that when property rights are transferred by one party to another
party, in connection with the performance of services, and subject to a
substantial risk of forfeiture, the fair market value of these rights should
be included in the transferor's taxable income when the interest loses its
substantial risk of forfeiture. 115 Some recent academic analysis suggests
that an attorney's contingency fee interest is a capital interest that is governed by section 83. 116 Although none of the circuits addressing the issue
have considered Section 83 in their analysis, application of it may lead to
110. See e.g., Coady, 213 F.2d at 1190.
III. See Robert W. Richards, Jr. & Fred Meissner, Feature: A New IRS Tax Audit Trigger j(Jr
Attorneys: Form 1099 Misc., 41 ORANGE COUNTY LAWYER 8, 9 (1999).
112. See Srivastava, 220 F.3d at 365.
113. See id.
114. See id. In Srivastava, the petitioner attempted to have the allotment adjusted to reflect
only actual damages based on the fact that the settlement for $8.5 million between the taxpayer and
the defendants was the same as the actual damages requested in the complaint. The court took issue
partly because the complaint requested "an amount in excess of $8,500,000.00." /d. at 365.
115. See 26 U.S.C. § 83(l)(A) (1994).
116. See Gregg D. Polsky, Taxing Contingent Attorneys' Fees: Many Courts Are Getting It
Wrong, 89 TAX NOTES 917 (Nov. 13, 2000).
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a different result in cases like Clarks where the pro-taxpayer decision
was made based significantly on a partnership analysis. 117 Consideration
of this section may lead to different structuring of fee agreements in anticipation of its application.
Determining the tax approach may also have consequences in how
the Internal Revenue Service deals with the returns in an eventual audit
and assessment of deficiency, depending on the circuit from which the
considerations are derived. Attempts to get around the circuits' decisions
could, theoretically, subject a taxpayer to penalties for substantial understatement of tax under section 6662 of the Internal Revenue Code unless
there is sufficient authority to establish the existence of reasonable cause
118
or a good faith belief that the taxpayer would be treated otherwise.
While the Internal Revenue Service may not assert these or similar penalties in all cases, the expense involved in potentially challenging the
penalties, or worse paying them, can be great to a taxpayer if their arguments for exclusion of the attorneys' fees are not sufficiently based on
the relevant precedents. 119
Finally, those taxpayers who fear the consequences and costs involved in a potential court fight with the Internal Revenue Service have
other options available to them under the Internal Revenue Code. The
code provides that taxpayers may take deductions for business expenses,
120
ordinary and necessary expenses "for the production or collection of
income," 121 and other expenses. Depending on the circumstances and
facts in the given case, attorneys' contingency fees may be deductible
and would reduce the taxpayer's tax liability. While deductions may not
be the most ideal end for a client, 122 where exclusion of the contingency
fee from income is not an option because of the jurisdiction or otherwise,
these deductions may serve to alleviate some of the financial pain experienced by the taxpayer on April 15th.

117. See id. at 922. But see Robert W. Wood, Leave Section 83 Out of This Mess, 89 TAX
NOTES 1187 (Nov. 27, 2000) (arguing that section 83 analysis has no place in determining whether
the attorney's portion of the contingency fee should be taxed to the client).
118. See Treas. Reg. § 1.6662-4 (200 I).
119. See Sheldon I. Banoff & Richard M. Lipton, Whipsaw on Lawsuit Settlements: The
Courts Still Can't Agree, 93 J. TAX'N. 12 (Sep. 2000).
120. See 26 U.S.C. § 162 (1994).
121. 26 U.S.C. § 212(1) (1994).
122. Under 26 U.S.C. § 67 (1994), the deductions may be subject to a floor equal to two percent of a taxpayer's adjusted gross income. They are also subject to phase-out for higher income
taxpayers. See 26 U.S.C. § 68 (1994). Similarly, for purposes of the Alternative Minimum Tax,
attorney's fees are not deductible where limited under§ 67. See 26 U.S.C. § 56(b)(l)(A)(i) (1994).
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VI. CONCLUSION
It is apparent that many questions still linger over the proper treatment of an attorney's contingency fee arising from punitive damages, interest on the judgment, and the like. The Srivastava decision, with analysis that seems to indicate one thing and a conclusion that says another,
seems representative of the existent split among many of the circuit
courts of appeals in the United States. Attorneys and their clients have a
daunting challenge to look to the approach prevailing in their circuits or
circumstances similar to their own. Their analysis of the issues must be
carefully done to avoid the messy consequences and high costs that may
result from misguided planning.
In spite of its contradictory result, the Srivastava court's analysis
probably comes closest to providing a reasonable solution. The court
wrote:
A taxpayer who enters into the contract recognizes that, to realize and
maximize the value of his claim, he must necessarily obtain the resources and expertise of counsel. But of course, the same is true of a
client who retains counsel on a non-contingent fee basis. The fact that a
contingent fee arrangement has the added benefits of risk-shifting and
realignment of incentives does not alter the economic reality .
. . . He ought not receive preferential tax treatment from the simple fortuity that he hired counsel on a contingent basis, for his attorney's
method of compensation did not meaningfully affect the gain he was
123
able to enjoy from a favorable resolution of the litigation.

Under the often-debated principle of horizontal equity in tax, similarly situated taxpayers should be treated equally by the tax code and the
courts. As the Fifth Circuit noted, there is no reason to reward a taxpayer
for pursuing their litigation with attorneys who are willing to enter into a
124
contingent arrangement. To the contrary, this kind of approach is tantamount to punishing those who are financially able to deal with their
counsel under a more traditional fee agreement. While it is arguable that
those who employ attorneys on a contingency fee basis have less means
than their counterparts, that loses relevance after a judgment is paid out.
In either circumstance, the taxpayer has received a judgment, and where
the judgment is not excludable under the Internal Revenue Code, the tax
treatment should be similar. A clear congressional or judicial directive to
include an attorney's contingency fee payment in the client's income

123. Srivastava, 220 F.3d at 362-63.
124. See id.
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would be the best resolution to the conflict as a matter of fairness and
equity.
Perhaps one day Congress or the Supreme Court will provide some
means of establishing uniformity in this increasingly difficult area and
will resolve the split amongst the circuits. There are any number of viable approaches that could be employed to resolve the issue. Until then,
taxpayers will be forced to keep grappling with the Internal Revenue
Service through its appellate procedures and the courts in hopes of
minimizing their tax liability.
Benjamin C Rasmussen

